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WHEN IS ENOUGH TOO MUCH?
THE BROADCAST DECENCY
ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 2005
AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT’S
PROHIBITION ON EXCESSIVE
FINES†
AMY KRISTIN SANDERS, ESQ.*

The next slip of the tongue or of the blouse will hit broadcasters
where it hurts: their wallet. With the recent passage of the Broadcast
1
Decency Enforcement Act of 2005 (“BDEA”), Congress raised
potential fines ten-fold in an attempt to clean up the airwaves and
prevent the televised snafus that have occurred with increasing
frequency during the past five years.2 From the broadcast of a barely
covered breast during the 2004 Super Bowl3 to the on-air
announcement of a four-letter expletive on a prime-time awards
4
show, indecent expression has attracted the attention of the general
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* Assistant Professor, School of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of
Minnesota-Twin Cities; Ph.D., University of Florida College of Journalism and
Communications, 2007; J.D., University of Iowa College of Law, 2003.
1. S. 193, 109th Cong. (2006).
2. See, e.g., Marylyn Geewax, Stiffer Fines for Smut on Radio, TV; Bush to Sign
Legislation Increasing FCC’s Clout, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, June 8, 2006, at A1;
Amy Schatz, Congress Toughens TV-Indecency Fines, WALL ST. J., June 8, 2006, at B2.
3. See Joe Flint & Anne Marie Squeo, Super Bowl Halftime Stunt Angers NFL, CBS,
FCC, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2004, at B1. During the 2004 Halftime Show, produced by MTV in
conjunction with CBS, Janet Jackson’s right breast was exposed. While she was singing a duet
with Justin Timberlake, he grabbed at her black bustier-style top, which ripped. The only thing
covering her breast was a metal nipple ornament.
4. See Anne Marie Squeo & Joe Flint, FCC Overturns Staff on Bono Profanity, WALL ST.
J., March 19, 2004, at B3. Singer Bono used the phrase “f---ing brilliant” during NBC’s
primetime broadcast of the 2003 Golden Globe Awards. Although the FCC Enforcement
Bureau initially deemed the phrase not indecent given the non-sexual context, the
commissioners overturned the ruling. Despite the FCC ruling that the language was indecent
and profane, no fines were issued.
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5
6
public, advocacy groups, the Federal Communications Commission
7
(“FCC”), and even Capitol Hill.8 In 2004 alone, the FCC assessed
more than $7.9 million in indecency fines, up from a mere $440,000 in
9
fines in 2003. The cost of airing future indecent material increased
exponentially when President George W. Bush signed the BDEA into
law on June 15, 2006.10 Although the number of fines being issued had
already increased, the FCC and a majority of Congress did not believe
that the relatively low maximum fine per incident was enough to
prevent multi-billion dollar broadcasters from choosing to air
11
indecent content and pay what to them was a nominal fine. The
Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2005, which had been
floating around Capitol Hill in various iterations since November
2004, thus raised the maximum fine per violation ten-fold, from
$32,500 to $325,000.12 Consequently, broadcasters now face liability of
up to $3 million in indecency fines for one syndicated broadcast aired
13
on multiple stations in multiple markets.

5. A Westlaw search of the Major U.S. Newspapers database using the terms “indecency”
and “FCC” in the same paragraph found 311 results since January 1, 2004. More than 44,000 hits
were located using the Google search engine and the phrase FCC “indecency fines” while
limiting the search to English pages updated in the past year.
6. See, e.g., Citizens for Community Values, http://www.ccv.org/Indecent_
Broadcasting.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2004). This website defines the outlines of indecent
broadcasting as a public service.
7. See FCC Enforcement Bureau, News Releases, http://www.fcc.gov/eb/News_Releases/
Welcome.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2004) (listing numerous news releases regarding FCC
decisions on indecency complaints).
8. Since January 2004, both houses of Congress have considered a variety of measures
concerning indecency in broadcasting. See, e.g., Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2004,
H.R. 3717, 108th Cong. (as passed by House, March 11, 2004) (intended to stiffen the penalties
for indecent broadcasting by increasing fines and toughening requirements for license renewal);
Families for ED Advertising Decency Act, H.R. 1420, 109th Cong. (2005) (to prohibit
advertisements for erectile dysfunction medication).
9. Indecency Complaints and NALs: 1993–2005, http://www.fcc.gov/eb/oip/Stats.html (last
visited June 7, 2006).
10. Pub. L. No. 109-235 (signed by George W. Bush on June 15, 2006); Broadcast Decency
Act Enforcement Act of 2005, S. 193, 109th Cong. (as passed by Congress on June 7, 2006).
Although officially titled for the year of its congressional introduction, the Broadcast Decency
Enforcement Act of 2005 did not become law until 2006.
11. Frank Ahrens, The Price for On-Air Indecency Goes Up: Congress Approves Tenfold
Increase in Fines FCC Can Assess, WASH. POST June 8, 2006, at D1 (“‘We hope that the hefty
fines will cause the multibillion-dollar broadcast networks finally to take the law seriously,’ said
L. Brent Bozell, PTC president.”).
12. Pub. L. No. 109-235; Broadcast Decency Act Enforcement Act of 2005, S. 193, 109th
Cong. (2006).
13. Id.
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This Article examines the increase in indecency fines in light of
the United States Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
relating to the prohibition of excessive fines. Section I begins with a
historical overview of the evolution of indecency regulation and the
role the FCC played in that evolution. A discussion of the FCC’s
current approach to regulating indecent broadcasting is also
14
included. Section II reviews the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of excessive fines and examines
the extent of the constitutional protection from such fines. Section III
addresses the Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act’s ten-fold
increase of indecency fines and evaluates this increase in light of legal
precedent. Section IV closes the Article with a discussion of the
constitutionality of the increased fines and the subsequent policy
implications of increasing fines for indecent broadcasts.
I. THE FCC AND INDECENCY REGULATION: THE STATUTES, THE
CODE, AND THE COURTS
Attempts to control the content of expression in the United States
have been around longer than the government,15 and efforts to
regulate indecent broadcasting began with the Federal Radio
16
Commission (“FRC”). When Congress passed the Communications
Act of 1934, it transformed the FRC into the FCC and expanded the
role of the agency from addressing signal interference to overseeing

14. See infra Section I.
15. See LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 16–62 (2003). Levy discusses
the lack of tolerance that existed in the American Colonies for expression that contained ideas
that were found to be detestable to the listening party. He notes:
“The persistent image of colonial America as a society in which freedom of expression
was cherished is an hallucination of sentiment that ignores history. . . . The American
people simply did not believe or understand that freedom of thought and expression
means equal freedom for the other person, especially the one with hated ideas.”
Id. at 16.
16. The Federal Radio Commission was the predecessor to the present-day Federal
Communications Commission and was established under The Radio Act of 1927. It consisted of
five members to be appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate. See
Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927). For a discussion of the development from the FRC,
which was primarily designed to deal with licensing and interference among radio signals, to the
FCC’s current role of regulating broadcast television and radio as well as telephony, see Seth T.
Goldsamt, “Crucified by the FCC”? Howard Stern, the FCC, and Selective Prosecution, 28
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 203 (1995).
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17
the development of telecommunications. It was this law that began
the FCC’s foray into the regulation of obscenity and indecency.18
Today, regulation of broadcast content in the United States comes
from several different sources, all of which inform the FCC and the
parties subject to the FCC’s jurisdiction.
The FCC’s legal authority to regulate indecency is codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1464. At only twenty-eight words, the statute makes it a
violation of federal law to broadcast obscene, indecent, or profane
material. The condensed statute reads, “Whoever utters any obscene,
indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or
19
both.” The statute’s enforcement provision provides the FCC with
the right to imprison or fine parties found guilty of broadcasting
violations.20 Until 1994, the statute contained a $10,000 cap on perviolation fines.21 In that year, the maximum fine amount was raised to
22
$27,500 per violation. In June of 2004, the FCC raised the amount to
$32,500 to adjust for inflation.23 Now, the BDEA provides for even
greater fines against broadcasters who air indecent content.24
Although 18 U.S.C. § 1464 prohibits the broadcast of obscene,
profane, or indecent material by broadcasters, the federal government
cannot completely expunge indecent material from the broadcast
airwaves due to the Supreme Court’s recognition of such material’s
limited First Amendment protection.25 Consequently, the FCC has

17. See Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 559). For an indepth review of the Communications Act of 1934, see A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989).
18. 47 U.S.C. § 559.
19. Broadcasting Obscene Language, 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006).
20. Id.
21. Pub. L. 103-322, § 330016(1)(L), 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
22. Id.
23. Reuters, Broadcast Indecency to Get Higher Fines, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2004, at C1.
24. S. 193, 109th Cong. (2006) (discussed infra Section IV).
25. See generally FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (holding that the FCC acted
within constitutional bounds when it regulated a broadcast of “patently offensive words”
including “obscene” content because the FCC had statutory authority to impose such
regulations and because the First Amendment does not guarantee absolute protection to
indecent language); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (holding that 49
U.S.C.S. §223(b) (1988), though enacted for the compelling purpose of protecting children from
pornography, was not tailored narrowly enough to meet constitutional scrutiny under the First
Amendment because it banned not only all "obscene" interstate commercial telephone
messages, but also all "indecent" messages); U.S. v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803
(2000) (holding that § 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was unconstitutional because
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established a safe-harbor period during the hours between 10 p.m.
and 6 a.m., when children are unlikely to be among the viewing
26
audience, wherein indecent material may be broadcast. Nonetheless,
because the § 1464 proscription only constrains broadcasters, cable
operators do not have to conform their indecent-programming
schedules to meet the safe-harbor requirements.27
Section 1464 provides little guidance for broadcasters facing
enforcement for broadcasting ostensibly indecent material outside of
the regulatory safe harbor. Such broadcasters may be subject to fines
or forfeitures. Instead of containing specific guidelines, the provision
serves as a general warning. For example, it contains no definition of
the terms “obscene,” “indecent,” or “profane.”28 Also absent from the
statute is a definition of “radio communication,” making it difficult to
determine precisely which broadcasts may be covered. And although
the FCC has defined “indecent material,”29 it has done little else to
further define or clarify the other terms contained in § 1464. Rather, it
30
focuses more on administrative procedure than substantive law.
Fortunately, the FCC’s regulations do provide some guidance for
enforcement by describing the forfeiture process in more detail,
establishing guidelines for assessing forfeitures under the
Communications Act, and discussing the administration of the
31
forfeiture process. In addition, in 2001 the FCC authored an
Indecency Policy Statement to illustrate how indecency
determinations are to be made.32
Under the 2001 policy statement, the FCC must make two
determinations before it can conclude that material is indecent.33 First,
it was not shown to be the least restrictive means to prevent unauthorized transmission of
sexually-explicit material).
26. Enforcement of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (restrictions on the transmission of obscene and
indecent material), 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.3999 (1995).
27. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. at 803.
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006).
29. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 732 (defining “indecent material” to encompass “language
or material that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities or
organs”).
30. Forfeiture Proceedings, 47 C.F.R. § 1.80 (2004).
31. Id.
32. In the Matter of Industry Guidance on the Commission’s Case Law Interpreting 18
U.S.C. § 1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency, 16 FCC Rec. 7999
(2001) [hereinafter FCC Indecency Policy Statement].
33. Id. at 8002.
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the FCC must determine whether the material falls within the
definition of “indecent content,” which specifically requires that the
FCC determine whether the material involves sexual or excretory
34
conduct. If the material does not, it falls outside the subject matter
proscribed by the indecency regulations.35 However, if the material
does involve sexual or excretory conduct, the FCC must make a
second determination because sexual or excretory conduct is
necessary, but not sufficient, to render material indecent.36 Thus, the
FCC must also determine whether the broadcast was “patently
37
offensive.”
The FCC’s offense test differs from the obscenity test established
38
by the Supreme Court in Miller v. California. There, obscenity was
39
defined based upon contemporary community standards. Obscenity
is material that the average person would find, when taken as a whole,
to appeal to the prurient interest; to depict or describe in patently
offensive terms; sexual or excretory functions that are specifically
defined by state law; or that lacks serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value.40 By contrast, the FCC’s determination of
offensiveness does not rely on particular community standards;
41
instead, it relies on a national standard for the broadcast community.
The FCC is also unconcerned with the individual sensitivities of a
42
particular complainant. Rather, it applies a reasonable person
standard that posits whether the average listener would be offended.43

34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. FCC Indecency Policy Statement, supra note 32, at 8002. This creates some interesting
First Amendment concerns given the FCC’s reliance on complaints from listeners as opposed to
a uniform monitoring process. Because the FCC only investigates the complaints it receives,
particularly sensitive callers are likely to make repeated referrals of programming they find to
be personally objectionable. This leaves programming at the fringes of political and social
acceptance highly susceptible to an FCC complaint. One way the FCC attempts to combat this is
its reliance on a reasonable person standard to determine offensiveness. However, the sea of
complaints has already been “self-screened” given the referral nature of the FCC’s regulation
process. See also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 731–33 (1978).
42. FCC Indecency Policy Statement, supra note 32, at 8002.
43. Id.
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Once the FCC deems a broadcast indecent, it actuates the
enforcement procedures established in the Code of Federal
44
Regulations. Under these procedures, the FCC traverses a series of
45
steps before exacting a fine or forfeiture from a broadcaster. Once
the FCC determines that indecent content was broadcast, it then
determines the amount of the forfeiture.46 The guidelines list various
factors to be consulted by the FCC in determining the fine, such as the
nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the violations, as well as
the broadcaster’s degree of culpability, history of prior offenses, and
47
ability to pay the fine. Section II of the regulation provides more
discretionary factors on which the FCC can base downward or
upward departures from the fining norms, such as “egregious
misconduct,” “substantial harm,” and “good faith or voluntary
disclosure.”48
The BDEA may soon lead to clearer agency guidelines on fines
for indecent broadcasts, in addition to forfeitures. Prior to the Act’s
passage, the FCC could not fine a broadcast licensee more than
$32,500 per broadcast violation for a total of $325,000 per act of
indecency. For example, in a situation where one company may air an
indecent song on ten of its affiliated radio stations, the company could
be fined up to $32,500 for each one of the ten stations, bringing its
49
total to $325,000 in fines. This in fact occurred in January 2004 when
the FCC determined that content on the “Bubba the Love Sponge”
radio show was indecent. After its determination, the FCC fined Clear
Channel Communications $715,000 in response to seven separate
broadcasts of indecent material on twenty-six stations.50
A. The Pacifica Case
While the federal regulations provide some guidance on the
application and enforcement of § 1464, the courts have been more
prolific in their interpretations of the provision.51 The Supreme Court
44. 47 C.F.R. § 1.80 (2004).
45. Id. § 1.80(a).
46. Id. § 1.80(b)(4).
47. Id.
48. Id. § 1.80.
49. Id. § 1.80(b)(1).
50. FCC Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture EB-02-IH-0261, adopted January 26,
2004, available at http://www.fcc.gov/eb/Orders/2004/FCC-04-17A1.html.
51. See cases cited supra note 25.
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endorsed the FCC’s authority to regulate indecent broadcasting in
52
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation. In that case, which concerned the daytime broadcast of George Carlin’s “Filthy Words” monologue on a
California radio station, the Court noted that the statute is written in
disjunctive language, granting the FCC the power to regulate
indecency, obscenity, and profanity.53 The Court also explicated the
54
meaning of “indecent.” Indecency, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote
for the majority, is a matter of taste, incapable of being categorically
defined but capable of being evaluated.55 The Court found that as
indecent content occupies the outer realm of First Amendment
56
protection, the FCC has the authority to restrict its broadcast.
Accordingly, the Court held that the FCC need not prove that a
broadcast’s content rises to the level of obscenity, which is afforded no
First Amendment protection, as established by Miller v. California.57
From its beginnings in Pacifica, the Court continued to develop the
nuances of indecency regulation through a series of cases over the
next two decades.
B. The Sable Communications Case
While Pacifica dealt with indecent broadcasts via the radio
airwaves, the Court’s next case addressed indecency via the telephone.
In Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC,58 Sable
Communications challenged a federal law that banned obscene and
indecent “dial-a-porn” telephone services. The Court ruled that the
prohibition of obscene telephone calls was constitutional under Miller
v. California because obscene materials fell outside the scope of the
First Amendment protections for speech.59 More importantly, the

52. FCC v. Pacfica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 738 (1978) (concluding that “§ 326[, the anticensorship provision of the Communications Act,] does not limit the Commission's authority to
impose sanctions on licensees who engage in obscene, indecent, or profane broadcasting”).
53. Id. at 739–40.
54. Id. at 739–41.
55. Id. at 742 (noting that, “[t]hat approach is appropriate for courts as well as the
Commission when regulation of indecency is at stake, for indecency is largely a function of
context—it cannot be adequately judged in the abstract”).
56. Id. at 750.
57. Id. at 741 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)). The Court dryly explains,
“[w]e simply hold that when the Commission finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise
of its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene.” Id. at 750–51.
58. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
59. Id. at 124.
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Court upheld the FCC’s ability to regulate broadcast speech based on
its indecent content, so long as the restriction was narrowly tailored to
60
achieve a substantial government interest. Nevertheless, the Court
held that the law at issue, which prevented adults from accessing
indecent telephone messages, was not narrowly tailored to achieve the
avowed interest of keeping the indecent content away from minors,
because it also infringed upon the ability of adults to access material
to which they had a legal right. Consequently, the law did not
withstand the strict constitutional scrutiny applied to content-based
61
restrictions of speech and therefore violated the First Amendment.
C. The Playboy Entertainment Case
In United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, the Supreme
Court extended protections to cable operators by providing sexuallyoriented programming the full protection of the First Amendment
when it struck down § 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 for
not meeting the strict constitutional scrutiny applied to content-based
restrictions of speech.62 Playboy Entertainment Group challenged a
federal law designed to protect children from obscene and indecent
63
content by requiring signal scrambling. Section 505 was aimed at
preventing signal bleed, a technical phenomenon whereby subscribers
to some cable channels may receive video or audio for channels to
which they do not subscribe.64 Often, these channels do not come in
clearly; instead, the signals are fuzzy and static-filled.65 Nonetheless, §
505 required cable operators who provide sexually-oriented
programming to either “fully scramble or otherwise fully block” the
content or restrict the broadcast of such programming to the safeharbor hours.66
Playboy Entertainment Group, which operates the Playboy
channels, asserted that the First Amendment protected its right to
provide indecent content and that the measures required by the
content-based regulation were not the least restrictive means to
60. Id. at 126.
61. Id.
62. 529 U.S. 803, 807 (2000). The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was also known as the
Communications Decency Act of 1995, when first introduced. Id.
63. Id. at 806.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 819.
66. Id. at 806.
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67
prevent children from accessing indecent content. Because the First
Amendment provides protection for indecent content, Playboy
asserted that the law must comport with strict scrutiny, and the
68
Supreme Court agreed. The Supreme Court ruled five to four that
cable operators enjoy the same rights as publishers and Internet
providers of indecent content.69 Thus, Playboy Entertainment Group
could not be forced to scramble its signals to prevent signal bleed, nor
could it be forced to confine its programming to the designated safeharbor hours.70

D. Summary
The Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment to
provide broadcasters with some protection from indecency regulation.
The First Amendment continues to serve as the most logical basis for
constitutional challenges to the imposition of FCC fines. However,
given the recent increases in fines, the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on excessive fines may play a new role in broadcasters’
attempts to challenge the FCC. Broadcasters used the novel Eighth
Amendment approach in the early 2000s, but the Supreme Court
never granted certiorari.71 With the advent of the BDEA’s potential $3
million fines, broadcasters may find new strength in an argument for
the Eighth Amendment protections.
II. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT’S EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE
The Eighth Amendment’s72 origins trace back to the 1776 Virginia
Declaration of Rights.73 The Virginia convention adopted language
into its Declaration of Rights that was subsequently incorporated by
74
eight other states into their state constitutions. This paved the way

67. Id. at 823.
68. Id. at 814.
69. Id. at 813–15.
70. Id. at 815.
71. See Grid Radio v. FCC, 278 F.3d 1314 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (discussed infra, Part IV).
72. The Eighth Amendment reads, “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
73. Section 9 of the Declaration of Rights adopted by the Virginia convention read “[t]hat
excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.” 1 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 288 (R. Rutland ed., 1970).
74. Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The Original
Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 840 (1969).
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for the inclusion of the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause,
75
after minimal debate in Congress, into the federal Constitution. As
compared to its sibling clause, the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment, which has been the topic of numerous legal
battles and scholarly articles, the Excessive Fines Clause has resided
relatively unnoticed.76
A. Delineating the Scope of Excessive Fines Protection
The Supreme Court has only recently begun to address the
meaning and scope of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on
excessive fines, hearing its first Excessive Fines Clause case in 1989.77
Throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, the Court decided a number of
cases that together developed its Eighth Amendment excessive fines
jurisprudence.78 Early on, the Court intimated that the Excessive Fines
Clause would apply only in the context of criminal proceedings,79 a
view that it solidified in Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc., where Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority,
noted that the courts had long concerned themselves only with
interpreting the excessive fines prohibition to “apply primarily, and
perhaps exclusively, to criminal prosecutions and punishments.”80
In Browning-Ferris, a civil action appealing a $6 million punitive
damages award for antitrust violations, the Court relied on the history
of the Excessive Fines Clause to hold that the Clause does not control
81
the amount of punitive damages awarded in civil cases. However, the
Court restricted the reach of its holding, thus preserving the
possibility that the prohibition may apply in other situations. The

75. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 782–83 (J. Gales & W. Seaton eds., 1789).
76. Granucci, supra note 74, at 840.
77. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
78. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998) (holding that forfeiture of nearly
$300,000 could violate the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause); Browning-Ferris, 492
U.S.. (holding that the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to awards of
punitive damages in cases between private parties); Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544
(1993) (holding that forfeiture of assets is the equivalent of a fine, for the purposes of the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against imposing excessive fines); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S.
602 (1993) (holding that the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause applies to in rem civil
forfeiture proceedings)..
79. See Ex Parte Watkins, 32 U.S. 568, 573–74 (1833) (“The Eighth Amendment is
addressed to courts of the United States exercising criminal jurisdiction.”).
80. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 262.
81. Id. at 264 n.4.
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Court first asserted that it “need not go so far as to hold that the
Excessive Fines Clause applies just to criminal cases.” The Court then
clarified that “[w]hatever the outer confines of the Clause’s reach may
be,” it was only deciding that “[the Clause] does not constrain an
award of money damages in a civil suit when the government neither
has prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive a share of the
82
damages awarded.” What is clear in light of Browning-Ferris is that
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines continues to
apply to actions taken under the auspices of federal criminal law.
However, Browning-Ferris says little to control the issue with regard
to indecency fines levied against broadcasters, because the money
received from such fines will be directed back to the government’s
coffers, unlike the damages that were awarded in Browning-Ferris.
Six years after Browning-Ferris, the Court established the current
test used to determine whether a fine or forfeiture is governed by the
83
Excessive Fines Clause. The Court held in Alexander v. United States
that statutory forfeitures of money or assets were analogous to
criminal fines and thus subject to the Eighth Amendment.84 In
Alexander, the defendant was convicted of violating federal obscenity
85
and racketeering laws. As a result, he was fined and sentenced to
prison time.86 In addition, the government sought to exact a forfeiture
of his assets under the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations
87
Act (“RICO”). The Court remanded the Eighth Amendment claims,

82. Id. at 263–64.
83. 509 U.S. 544 (1993).
84. Id. at 559.
85. Id. at 543.
86. Id.
87. Alexander, 509 U.S. at 546. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (2003), the RICO statute which
provides that,
[w]hoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years (or for life if the violation is based on a
racketeering activity for which the maximum penalty includes life imprisonment), or
both, and shall forfeit to the United States, irrespective of any provision of State law—
(1) any interest the person has acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962; (2)
any—(A) interest in; (B) security of; (C) claim against; or (D) property or contractual
right of any kind affording a source of influence over; any enterprise which the person
has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in
violation of section 1962; and (3) any property constituting, or derived from, any
proceeds which the person obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity
or unlawful debt collection in violation of section 1962. The court, in imposing
sentence on such person shall order, in addition to any other sentence imposed
pursuant to this section, that the person forfeit to the United States all property
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ruling that the Eighth Amendment applies to both the fine and
forfeiture. In doing so, the Court noted “[t]he in personam criminal
forfeiture at issue here is clearly a form of monetary punishment no
88
different, for Eighth Amendment purposes, from a traditional fine.”
Additionally, the Court opined that when determining whether the
fine and forfeiture were excessive, the appellate court must consider
89
the length and severity of the defendant’s violative conduct. Thus,
under Alexander, statutory fines exacted for indecent broadcasts
would be controlled by the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines
Clause.
The Alexander opinion was one of two Eighth Amendment
Excessive Fines Clause cases decided within the same term. In Austin
90
v. United States, the Court held the Eighth Amendment applicable to
in rem civil forfeitures.91 After the defendant was convicted of
violating state drug laws, the United States filed an in rem civil action
92
seeking forfeiture of his assets. Relying on Browning-Ferris and the
history of the Excessive Fines Clause, the Austin Court found that the
prohibition was designed to prevent the government from exacting
too high a price from its citizens and abusing its power to punish.93
Thus, the dispositive factor is not whether the action is criminal or
civil, but whether the money or assets are exacted as a form of
punishment.94
The Austin Court stipulated that before one can determine
whether a fine or forfeiture has been exacted as a form of
punishment, an examination of the purposes for exacting the sanction
95
must be conducted. In formulating this requirement, the Court relied
on United States v. Halper,96 wherein it was stated that “a civil sanction

Id.

described in this subsection. In lieu of a fine otherwise authorized by this section, a
defendant who derives profits or other proceeds from an offense may be fined not
more than twice the gross profits or other proceeds.

88. Alexander, 509 U.S. at 558.
89. Id. at 559.
90. 509 U.S. at 602 (1993).
91. Id. at 604.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 607.
94. Id. at 610.
95. Id. at 611.
96. 490 U.S. 435 (1989), overruled on other grounds by Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S.
93 (1997).
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that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but
rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or
deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the
97
term.” Additionally, the Austin Court discussed the historical view of
fines and forfeitures at the time the Excessive Fines Clause was
written. In the context of doing so, it determined that both were
meant to be punitive in nature at the time of the Eighth
Amendment’s enactment.98
B. Defining “Excessive” under the Eighth Amendment
Once it has been determined that a fine or forfeiture is punitive in
nature, the fine or forfeiture is allowed unless it is deemed excessive
in violation of the Excessive Fines Clause. The Court began to
articulate its excessive analysis in Austin. It further clarified the test in
United States v. Bajakajian,99 noting that proportionality forms the
primary focus of the inquiry.100 Proportionality requires the fine or
forfeiture to be in line with the seriousness of the violation it is
101
designed to punish. Thus, the Bajakajian Court clarified that a fine
greatly disproportional to the violation would be unconstitutional.102
Because determining whether a fine or forfeiture is greatly
disproportionate is not an exact science, the Court showed
considerable deference to both the legislature, which determines the
range of possible fines, and the trial courts, which determine the
actual fine assessed in a particular case.103 Thus, no bright-line rule can
97. Id. at 448.
98. Austin, 509 U.S. at 614 (noting “[o]ur cases also have recognized that statutory in rem
forfeiture imposes punishment”).
99. 524 U.S 321 (1998).
100. Id. at 334.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 334–35. “The text and history of the Excessive Fines Clause demonstrate the
centrality of proportionality to the excessiveness inquiry; nonetheless, they provide little
guidance as to how disproportional a punitive forfeiture must be to the gravity of an offense in
order to be ‘excessive.’” Id. at 335.
103. Id. at 335–36. The Court explains the factors that it takes into account:

We must therefore rely on other considerations in deriving a
constitutional excessiveness standard, and there are two that we find
particularly relevant. The first, which we have emphasized in our
cases interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, is that
judgments about the appropriate punishment for an offense belong
in the first instance to the legislature. . . . The second is that any
judicial determination regarding the gravity of a particular offense
will be inherently precise.
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104
be applied to the proportionality analysis. Instead, courts must
compare the amount of the fine or value of the forfeiture to the
severity of the crime to determine if they are grossly
105
disproportionate. If so, then the fine or forfeiture is unconstitutional
under the Eighth Amendment protection against excessive fines.106

III. UPPING THE ANTE: INCREASING INDECENCY FINES
Congress examined several variations of the legislation aimed at
increasing the FCC’s ability to regulate broadcast indecency before
107
passing the Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2005. The
earlier legislation proposed a variety of potentially harsh
punishments, ranging from increased fines to tougher license-renewal
procedures.108 In addition, both the House and Senate held hearings in
early 2004 to address the recent indecent broadcasts. While on Capitol
Hill, the FCC commissioners testified that they needed the ability to
strengthen current indecency regulations.109 To garner this ability, the
commissioners proposed a number of changes to the then-current
110
policy.
The commissioners’ proposed changes to indecency regulation
focused on a number of areas, including the amount of the fines and
the ability to revoke broadcast licenses. All of the commissioners
supported an increase in the current fine structure, with some of the
commissioners noting that the current $32,500 per-violation cap was

Id. at 336.
104. Id. The Court notes that “[b]oth of these principles counsel against requiring strict
proportionality between the amount of a punitive forfeiture and the gravity of a criminal
offense, and we therefore adopt the standard of gross disproportionality articulated in our Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause precedents.” Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Broadcast Decency Responsibility Enforcement Act of 2004, S. 2147, 108th Cong.
(2004); Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2004, H.R. 3717, 108th Cong. (2004); Broadcast
Decency Enforcement Act of 2004, S. 2056, 108th Cong. (2004).
108. See S. Res. 283, 108th Cong. (2003) (affirming the Senate’s “need to protect children in
the United States from indecent programming”).
109. The Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2004: Hearing on H.R. 3717 Before the
Subcomm. on Telecomms. and the Internet of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong.
78, 83, 93, 97, 101 (2004) [hereinafter Broadcast Decency Hearing] (statements of FCC
Commissioners Michael Powell, Kevin Martin, Kathleen Abernathy, Jonathon Adelstein, and
Michael Copps, respectively).
110. Id.
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111
hardly enough to punish media giants like Clear Channel. They
encouraged Congress to increase the amounts the FCC could exact
from broadcasters. One proposal, supported by the commissioners,
112
would have raised the maximum fine to $500,000 per violation. In
addition, this proposed legislation also contained provisions that
toughened licensure and provided for other punishments for indecent
broadcasts; for example, broadcasters found in violation of the FCC’s
indecency policy would have been required to air public-service
announcements addressing the listening and educational needs of
children.113 That proposed legislation also made indecency violations a
consideration for license renewal by considering whether the
broadcaster had paid any fines that had been assessed.114 It also would
have enacted a potential three-strikes policy that would allow the
FCC to suspend a broadcaster’s license after three indecent
broadcasts.115
Ultimately, the BDEA adopted some of the earlier proposals’
provisions while abandoning the harshest proposed penalties. Most
notably, the Act provided for the large increase in indecency
penalties.116 However, it abandoned the licensing strictures and the
public service announcement provisions, focusing instead on the
monetary aspects of regulating indecency.117

IV. EXCESSIVE FINES IN THE FUTURE
Provisions increasing the amount of possible fines for indecent
broadcasting will likely face considerable challenges in the courts. For
example, CBS, which lost its appeal regarding the FCC fines levied

111. Id. at 101 (statement of FCC Commissioner Michael Copps).
112. Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2004, H.R. 500; S.R. 283 (2003).
113. Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2004, H.R. 3717, § 6, 108th Cong. (2004). It
notes that,
the Commission may, in addition to imposing a penalty under this section, require the
licensee or permittee to broadcast public service announcements that serve the
educational and informational needs of children. Such announcements may be
required to reach an audience that is up to 5 times the size of the audience that is
estimated to have been reached by the obscene, indecent, or profane material, as
determined in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Commission.
Id.
114. Id.
115. H.R. 3717 § 9.
116. Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2005, S. 193, 109th Cong. (2006) (enacted).
117. Id.
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against it for the 2004 Super Bowl, will likely proceed all the way
through the federal courts in an effort to get the $550,000 exactment
118
dropped. To date, the Supreme Court has not addressed the Eighth
Amendment Excessive Fines prohibition in the context of indecency
fines. The closest example came in a District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals case that questioned the constitutionality of FCC
119
fines for a 2002 unlicensed broadcast. There, the FCC fined a lowpower radio broadcaster for operating without a license as required
under 47 U.S.C. § 301.120 In Grid Radio v. FCC, the court paid little
121
attention to the broadcaster’s Eighth Amendment claim. Instead,
the court held that the fine for unlicensed broadcasting was statutory
in nature, which meant it was not subject to unlimited discretion
under § 301, and would therefore be constitutional under the Eighth
Amendment.122 The court’s ruling grants nearly unlimited discretion to
the FCC and Congress to set fines approaching unlimited amounts
without worrying about the constitutionality of the proposals. Thus,
for a broadcaster to win a case under the theory that heightened
indecency fines violate the Eighth Amendment, it likely would have
to take the case all the way to the Supreme Court, where it would
invoke not only the Eighth Amendment but also the First
Amendment’s free speech guarantees. Given the corporate media
landscape, CBS’s current predicament, and the potential for dramatic
increases in both indecency complaints and fines, this is not out of the
question.
As the number of media corporations decreases and the number
of outlets they own increases, concern regarding the per-violation fine
amount will naturally grow. As profit-driven industry players, media
conglomerates will seek to decrease operating costs while maximizing
their audience. Syndicated programming that can be broadcast on
numerous stations owned by a single company provides one way to
118. Brooks Boliek, No ‘Malfunction’ for the FCC: $550,000 Super Bowl Fine Against CBS
Upheld, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, June 1, 2006, at 1.
119. Grid Radio v. FCC, 278 F.3d 1314 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that the FCC’s imposition
of fines against an unlicensed low-power FM broadcaster did not violate the Eighth
Amendment).
120. Id.
121. Grid Radio, 278 F.3d at 1322.
122. Id. (noting, “[t]he $11,000 represents the statutory penalty (adjusted for inflation) for
unlicensed operation of a radio station, or for each day of a continuing violation. The amount is
neither indefinite nor unlimited, nor does it seem excessive in view of Szoka’s continued and
willful violation of the licensing requirement.”).
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accomplish this. Infinity’s reliance on the Howard Stern radio show
123
during the early part of this century is an example of this conduct.
The relationship between Infinity and Stern also typified another
concern facing broadcasters: wider liability. When Howard Stern
broadcast indecent content on his show, Infinity was liable for each
broadcast. Thus, if Infinity aired Stern on thirty-five stations, it could
be fined thirty-five times for indecent content that hit the airwaves.
The potential for such enormous repercussions has left many
broadcasters with no choice but to alter their programming. Since
2004, Stern and Bubba the Love Sponge have left the commercial
airwaves in favor of subscription-based satellite radio services that,
like cable operators, are not subject to indecency regulation.
Under these circumstances, tougher regulations could spur an
intense Eighth Amendment battle, pitting the proportionality of
indecency fines against the severity of indecency violations. Such a
challenge would require the courts to examine the Eighth
Amendment as it is applied to the companies while making First
Amendment judgments about the potential value and taste of a
broadcast’s content. An analysis under the Excessive Fines Clause
would determine quickly that the FCC’s indecency fines fall within
the Eighth Amendment protection because the fines are designed
purely to punish broadcasters for undesirable conduct. Their punitive
nature may well subject them to constitutional scrutiny.
A. Problems with Proportionality
Courts might find that the FCC’s proposed fine increases would
run afoul of the Constitution under the proportionality analysis.
Because each review for excessiveness is highly fact-sensitive, the
recent increase could be subject to both facial and as-applied
challenges to its constitutionality. A facial review would merely
examine the language of the BDEA without looking at the Act’s
application to a specific broadcaster.124 Under this type of review, the
123. As a result of growing concerns over the regulation of indecent programming, Howard
Stern left commercial radio in late 2004. Since January 2006, his show has been aired on Sirius
Satellite Radio, which is not subject to control by the FCC. See Krysten Crawford, Howard
Stern Jumps to Satellite, CNNMONEY.COM, Oct. 6, 2004, http://money.cnn.com/
2004/10/06/news/newsmakers/stern_sirius/?cnn=yes (reporting Stern’s move to satellite radio).
124. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 474 (1974) (noting that a facial challenge posits
that a statute is invalid “in toto—and therefore incapable of any valid application”); see also City
of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 n.22 (1999) (explaining that a party mounting a facial
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recent increase likely would satisfy constitutional standards, because
it is a statutory fine that sets only a maximum fine ceiling and
delineates the criteria for assessing those fines. However, a challenge
based on the application of the increased fines to a specific
broadcaster would be more constitutionally troublesome.
As-applied review of the statute would require that courts
examine a situation where the FCC found an actual broadcaster liable
for indecency violations and then subjected it to a fine under the
BDEA. An as-applied review would require a reviewing court to
examine four main categories to determine whether a fine is
constitutionally excessive. First, a court would need to review the facts
of the incident as it occurred and take the content of the supposed
indecent broadcast into account, reviewing a variety of factors.
Potential constitutional conflicts could arise with this determination
because it would require an evaluation of the broadcast’s taste and
value. This places the review at odds with the First Amendment
jurisprudence. Some content, such as blatant sexual references, would
likely merit stronger fines based simply on its offensiveness. A second
excessiveness consideration would be the length and repetitive nature
of an alleged indecent broadcast. Under the FCC’s guidelines, fleeting
references or implicit innuendo often receive less harsh treatment
125
than lengthy and explicit broadcasts. A third factor that courts
should consider is the time of broadcast and possible audience. An
indecent broadcast falling slightly out of the safe-harbor window of 10
p.m. to 6 a.m. would likely not be punished as severely as indecency
that is broadcast at noon. Finally, courts would take into account the
broadcaster’s history of indecent broadcasting. Because the fines are
intended to punish, both through punitive and deterrent means, it
would seem only logical that a broadcaster should receive harsher
fines if it has a history of indecency violations.
Together, these factors should play a role in a reviewing court’s
determination of whether a fine meets the proportionality test, or
whether it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the violation.
Although consideration of these factors would best serve the
Supreme Court’s established standard of review for Eighth

challenge “seeks to vindicate not only his own rights, but those of others who may also be
adversely impacted by the statute in question”).
125. FCC Indecency Policy Statement, supra note 32, at 8002–03.
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Amendment Excessive Fines Clause cases, they would also require
the courts to walk a First Amendment tightrope.
B. Clearing Constitutional Hurdles
There are two situations where excessive indecency fines might
pass constitutional muster. First, the courts would probably offer
greater deference to FCC decisions, providing that the agency
considered the above factors when determining an appropriate fine
for each individual incident. Second, a court might also allow the FCC
to exact the maximum fine against all broadcasters in all cases. Similar
zero-tolerance policies have been upheld in other areas of criminal
law. For example, mandatory minimum sentencing under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines has been held constitutional.126 Thus, a plan
that provided the FCC with only the discretion to determine whether
a fine is merited might also be constitutional under the Eighth
Amendment so long as the established fine amount is not facially
excessive.
V. CONCLUSION
Nominal, cost-of-doing-business fines are not the answer to
indecency regulation.127 However, constantly upping the ante
essentially allows wealthy media companies to pay to play indecent
content and exercise their First Amendment rights while forcing
smaller operations to self-censor in an effort to err on the side of
caution. In addition, if not properly administered, the recent fine
increases could contravene the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines
Clause. Instead of exacting more money from broadcasters, the FCC
should consider other measures, including tougher licensing and
renewal processes, to encourage broadcasters to comply with
indecency regulations. Self-regulation within the industry could also
be explored. While many of these measures were addressed during
Congress’s two-year battle with indecency regulation, all were
abandoned in favor of mere monetary penalties, which are arguably
more lucrative and easier to enforce. But rather than relying on an

126. See, e.g., Alamendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (holding that
Congress has discretion in establishing statutory punishment ranges, including mandatory
minimum sentences).
127. Broadcast Decency Hearing, supra note 109, at 78, 83, 93, 97, 101.
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easy-to-enact system that will likely chill the expression of those
broadcasters without large wallets, indecency regulation should
instead focus on restrictions that best serve the needs of all
broadcasters and their audiences given the changes in media
ownership.

